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Abstract
It is the aim of this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of level of scientific
discipline within the truth-maker framework. In particular, I exploit the mereological
relation of proper parthood, which is integral to truth-maker semantics, in order to
provide an account of scientific level.
Introduction
The philosophy of science is replete with discussions of level. Arguably, physics occupies
a lower level than chemistry, which occupies a lower level than biology, which occupies
a lower level than ecology, etc.. Practicing scientists are also prone to describing their
respective disciplines in terms of level; it is not uncommon to encounter assertions like
‘This problem ought to be accommodated at the level of quantum mechanics, rather than
chemistry.’1 But while there is some (if far from universal) measure of agreement over the
presence of scientific level—and even some (if far from universal) measure of agreement
over what the levels actually are—there is currently no consensus on what a scientific level
itself consists of. While many maintain the physics occurs at a more fundamental level
than ecology does, it is far from clear what makes this the case: what it is in virtue of that
one scientific discipline occurs at a higher level than another.
One type of characterization is epistemic. Perhaps we ought to understand what a
scientific level is in terms of what it required to understand that science. The reason
biology is at a higher level than chemistry, some might reasonably maintain, is that an
exhaustive understanding of biology requires at least some understanding of chemistry,
1One example, chosen eﬀectively at random, is the following: “Nowadays, both theoretical and exper-
imental investigations have presented a conclusion that the evanescent modes of the electromagnetic field
can superluminally propagate. At the level of quantum mechanics, via tunneling analogy the superluminal
propagation of evanescent modes has been described as the quantum tunneling behavior of photons, which
implies that the superluminality of evanescent modes is due to a quantum eﬀect. In this paper at the
level of quantum field theory, we will further show that the superluminality of evanescent modes is due
to a purely quantum eﬀect, and clarify some misunderstandings on the physical properties of evanescent
modes.” (Wang, Xiong and He, 2008, pg. 319—emphasis mine).
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while it is possible to understand chemistry without any comprehension of biology at all.
More generally, there is a perfectly intelligible interpretation according to which discipline
D occupies a lower level than discipline D1 just in case an understanding of D1 requires an
understanding of D, but an understanding of D does not require an understanding of D1.
But there is another notion of scientific level—one that finds its home in metaphysics,
rather than epistemology. On this conception, the reason that biology occurs at a higher
level than chemistry has nothing whatsoever to do with our epistemic access to biological
and chemical facts. Even if these disciplines were to lie far beyond our epistemic reach,
chemistry would remain more fundamental than biology. On this conception, there is a
worldly relation which obtains between the disciplines, and it is because the disciplines
stand in this relation that some are at diﬀerent levels from others. An interpretation of the
levels of science, on this approach, amounts to an account of what this worldly relation is.
Some might be tempted to account for this relation in terms of grounding—a primitive
relation of metaphysical dependence that has garnered substantial interest in recent years.2
Perhaps the reason biology is at a higher level than chemistry is that every biological fact
is grounded in chemical facts, and perhaps the reason physics is not at a higher level than
economics is that there are at least some physical facts which are not grounded in economic
facts. I myself am skeptical of this approach. Of course, one may freely refer to the levels
of science as ‘grounding,’ but this merely aﬃxes a name to the mystery; it does not render
it unmysterious. And the claim that grounding is primitive rings of defeatism—amounting
to the admission that there is no reductive analysis of this phenomenon to be found.
It is my aim to provide such an analysis: to uncover necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for one scientific discipline to occupy a higher level than another. The approach I adopt
exploits the theoretical resources of truth-maker semantics—a burgeoning field with appli-
cations that span the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and beyond.3 Roughly, it is my
claim that the states of aﬀairs which make it the case that objects satisfy higher-level predi-
cates are composed of states of aﬀairs which make it the case that objects satisfy lower-level
predicates. For example, it may be that states of aﬀairs concerning ‘is carbon-dioxide’ are
composed of states of aﬀairs concerning ‘is carbon’ and ‘is oxygen.’ My approach thus relies
upon the notion of proper-parthood inherent within this semantic framework in order to
account for scientific level. While some background in truth-maker semantics will facilitate
an understanding of the account I provide, it is not strictly needed for what I claim here,
2The literature on ground has quickly grown too substantial to adequately address in a footnote. Early
converts include, e.g., Schaﬀer (2009, 2010); Fine (2012b,c). Those who advocate interpretations of scientific
level along these lines include, e.g., Dasgupta (2014); Schaﬀer (2017). However, for some detractors to this
approach, see, e.g., Della Rocca (2014); Wilson (2014).
3For an overview of truth-maker semantics, see ?. For uses of truth-maker semantics in this area, see
deRosset (2017); Elgin (2020). I am very sympathetic to deRosset’s claim; I take it to be the closest in
the literature to my own. One point of diﬀerence is that, while he is concerned with the truth-maker
approach as it concerns levels of facts, I am concerned with its application to disciplines. Thus, while his
approach may determine that the chemical fact that water is a compound is grounded in physical facts, I
am concerned with what it takes for chemistry to be at a higher level than physics.
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and I have attempted (albeit not entirely successfully) to restrict myself to an informal
presentation where possible.
Before commencing with the discussion of scientific level, two points bear on limitations
of this paper. First, as with many interpretive debates within our discipline, I do not assume
that there is a unique correct resolution.4 Perhaps multiple theories of scientific level are
adequate. What I oﬀer is an interpretation of level, rather than the interpretation of level.
To that end, I proceed by arguing that my interpretation satisfies our theoretical demands,
not by claiming that it is preferable to competing views. Second, this paper is strictly
intended to remain agnostic about which disciplines occupy which levels—and, indeed, on
whether the disciplines are leveled at all. Although I occasionally appeal to intuitions
about the levels of science, and although I am personally susceptible to the view that
there are levels of empirical science, it is perfectly compatible with what I have to say that
there are not. In this case, I provide conditions which fail to obtain; the reason that the
sciences are unleveled is that they do not stand in the relation I articulate. This puts my
approach at odds with others in the literature. While those who debate the interpretation
of physicalism often take no stand on whether physicalism is true, those who debate the
interpretation of scientific level regularly express commitments to the levels of science.5 In
contrast, I restrict myself to the interpretive question—I am concerned with what a level
of science is, not with what the levels of science are.
Theoretical Desiderata
I maintain that the following are theoretical desiderata for any interpretation of scientific
level:
1. To form a strict partial ordering over the disciplines.
2. To account for the reductive component of level.
3. To allow for properties to be multiply realized.
4. To remain agnostic about what the levels of science are.
5. To permit crossover in subject-matter between levels of discipline.
Let us take these in turn.
1. To Form A Strict Partial Ordering Over The Disciplines
A (binary) relation is a strict partial ordering just in case it is irreflexive, asymmetric and
transitive. By claiming that an adequate account of level forms such an ordering, I thus
maintain that the following obtains:
4For a discussion of this point as it pertains to the interpretation of physicalism, see Crane and Mellor
(1990).
5See, most canonically, Oppenheim and Putnam (1958); Fodor (1974).
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i) No discipline is at a higher level than itself.
ii) If discipline D1 is at a higher level than discipline D2, then discipline D2 is not
at a higher level than discipline D1.
iii) If discipline D1 is at a higher level than discipline D2 and discipline D2 is at a
higher level than discipline D3, then discipline D1 is at a higher level than
discipline D3.
I have nothing substantial in support of this desideratum to oﬀer.6 Its best defense is
that it is overwhelmingly obvious that it is true. The intuition that sciences are not at
higher levels than themselves (and that the other corresponding claims hold) runs deep.
To my mind, the satisfaction of this condition is not merely desirable, but compulsory.
Any account which fails to form a strict partial ordering over the disciplines ought to be
abandoned, regardless of whatever other advantages it might have.
2. To Account For The Reductive Component Of Level
The notion of level seems to be inextricably tied to that of reduction.7 If thermodynamics
occurs at a higher level than statistical mechanics, it seems no accident that thermody-
namics reduces to statistical mechanics.8 But why maintain that they go hand-in-hand?
Consider what would obtain were this not the case. Suppose that, as a matter of socio-
logical fact, physics was divided into diﬀerent subfields than it actually is. Rather than
addressing issues concerning relativity, quantum field theory, fluid dynamics and the like,
the discipline was subdivided by the size of particle under investigation. One branch dealt
with elements with an atomic mass under 10 amu, (studying the elements Hydrogen, He-
lium, Lithium, and Beryllium), another branch investigated the elements with atomic mass
between 10-20 amu (studying the elements Boron, Carbon, Nitrogen, Oxygen, and Fluo-
rine), etc.. If this were so, would it be the case that some branches of physics occupied
6Perhaps there could be an appeal to the notion of fundamentality. If one science is at a higher level
than another, then facts regarding the latter are more fundamental than facts regarding the former. And if
relative fundamentality itself forms a strict partial ordering over facts, it may be that an account of levels
must form such an ordering over sciences. For an example of philosophers who subscribe to this criterion,
see (Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958, pg. 7).
7Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) discusses the notion of reduction extensively in this context. They hold
that there are three levels of the unity of science, two of which explicitly concern reduction. They state,
for example, “Unity of Science in the weakest sense is attained to the extent to which all the terms of the
science are reduced to the terms of some one discipline” (pg. 3), and later “Second, the Unity of Science
in a stronger sense...is represented by the Unity of Laws. It is attained to the extent to which the laws of
science become reduced to the laws of some one discipline” (pg. 4). Fodor (1974) mentions, but does not
endorse the reductive conception of levels, saying “Saying that physics is basic science and saying that the
theories in the special sciences must reduce to physical theories have seemed to be two ways of saying the
same thing” (pg. 97). See, also, Nagel (1961).
8For discussions of this particular example—which remains among the most successful examples of
reduction in the sciences, see Sklar (1993, 1999); Callender (1999); Albert (2000).
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a higher level than the others? Arguably, no. The subdisciplines would fall into a strict
partial ordering (for the simple reason that arranging particles by mass forms a strict par-
tial ordering), so the first desideratum is satisfied. But there is no sense in which the
disciplines could be said to reduce to one another. The relation between thermodynamics
and statistical mechanics is unlike the relation between the study of Boron and the study
of Beryllium precisely because Boron cannot be reduced to Beryllium.
Of course, reduction need not only occur between the levels of scientific disciplines—it
may also occur within them. Nickles (1973) and Wimsatt (1976, 2006), for example, argue
that there are two species of reduction: inter-level and intra-level. Inter-level reductions
oﬀer explanations of phenomena within a scientific discipline. It may, for example, explain
how air pressure aﬀects the distribution of clouds or how a complex chemical reaction
reduces to a series of simpler ones. Intra-level reductions, in contrast, reduce phenom-
ena at one scientific level to another. This is the ostensible reduction of macroeconomic
phenomena to psychological phenomena, or of ecological phenomena to biological phe-
nomena. Furthermore, there are various forms this desideratum might take depending
upon the notion of reduction employed. Some advocate accounts of reduction in terms
of causation/explanation (see Kim (1998)), organization (see Churchland and Sejnowski
(1992)), size (see Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956); Oppenheim and Putnam (1958); Wim-
satt (1976)), analysis (see Sheperd (1994)), or realization (see Gillett (2002)). For each
notion of reduction, there is a corresponding conception of level: one according to which
the higher levels reduce to the lower levels for that type of reduction.
The desideratum of reduction might also be described in terms of relevance; the lower
level sciences are relevant to those that lie at higher levels than them. It does not suf-
fice, when investigating interdisciplinary level, to demonstrate that two fields of study
are compatible with one another. Chemistry and physics not only avoid conflict, but
compliment—physical goings-on are relevant to chemical reactions. And it seems at least
partially for this reason that chemistry plausibly lies at a higher level than physics. If two
fields had nothing whatsoever to do with one another, this would preclude them from being
relatively leveled. Accounts of scientific level ought to explain why this is the case: why it
is that the respective disciplines are relevant to each other.
A related consideration concerns the possibility of emergence. Some maintain that ob-
jects bear emergent properties.9 For example, it may be that minds depend upon brains,
but that mental properties are, in some important respect, independent from the brain-
states that they depend upon. Often, the possibility of emergence is taken to count against
9As with the interpretation of scientific level, there are numerous accounts of emergence in the literature.
Some describe emergence in epistemic terms—see, e.g., Popper and Eccles (1977); Bedau (1997); Nagel
(1961); Teller (1992). Roughly, the thought is that a higher-level property is emergent just in case its
presence cannot be derived or understood from knowledge of lower-level properties. Others, however,
describe emergence in metaphysical/ontological terms—see, e.g., O’Connor (1994); Humphreys (1996);
Kim (1999). And, as with the characterization of scientific level, I restrict my attention to metaphysical
interpretations of emergence for the purposes of this paper.
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the claim that scientific disciplines are leveled.10 If a discipline contains emergent proper-
ties, then it cannot be fully reduced to another discipline. However, others endorse accounts
of level compatible with emergent properties.11 The distinction between these approaches
can also be understood in terms of relevance. For, if we require that leveled disciplines be
entirely relevant to one another, the interpretation will preclude the presence of emergent
properties, but if we only require that leveled disciplines be at least partially relevant to
one another, emergence may abound.
There is, arguably, a deep conflict between the first and second desiderata. It might
even be suggested that no account of level could possibly satisfy both and, consequently,
that the very notion of level ought to be abandoned. Many maintain that reduction is
closely tied to identity.12 If one theory were to reduce to another, but facts about the
former remained distinct from facts about the latter, it would seem to be reductive in
name only. But if two disciplines are genuinely reductive, it is diﬃcult to see how either
could be at a higher level than the other. hat is to say, it appears that the claim that D1
reduces to D2 requires that D1 “ D2. But if D1 “ D2, then an application of Leibniz’s Law
ensures that every property D1 bears is also borne by D2. This, by stipulation, includes
the property of being at a higher level than D2, which entails that D2 is at a higher level
than itself. This violates irreflexivity, which I have already claimed to be indispensable to
a theory of level. If an account were—somehow—able to satisfy both the first and second
desiderata, it would count substantially in its favor.
3. To Allow For Properties To Be Multiply Realized
It is widely accepted that some properties can be multiply realized.13 A property is said to
be multiply realizable just in case it can be manifested by diverse underlying configurations.
Plastic shaped in the appropriate way may form a cup, but cups can be made of metal
or glass as well. And it may be that pain is associated with firing C-fibers in humans,
but it is perfectly conceivable for organisms with diverse neurological profiles to experience
phenomenal pain.
Some interpretations of scientific level are incompatible with multiply realizable prop-
erties.14 For example, Nagel (1961) requires that the properties of the higher-level sciences
be identified with properties in the lower-level sciences. In order for the biological property
being a heart to reduce to a chemical property, there must be some chemical property that
it is identical to. But if being a heart is multiply realizable (perhaps hearts can be com-
10For a discussion along these lines, see, e.g., Humphreys (2019).
11See, for example, Campbell (1974).
12For recent discussions along these lines, see Dorr (2016); Correia (2017).
13There is an extensive debate over how best to understand what multiple realizability consists of. To
the extent that I can, this is a debate I wish to avoid. See, however, Heil (1999); Gillett (2003); Polger
(2004); Morris (Forthcoming).
14See Fodor (1974) for the original discussion of this point. Wimsatt (2006) also maintains that an
account of level ought to be compatible with multiple realizability.
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posed of carbon, silicon, etc.) there may be no property which it is identical to. Of course,
it is always possible to identify being a heart with the disjunction of its realizations—to
claim that to be a heart is to either be carbon shaped thus and so, silicon shaped thus and
so, etc.. But, some have argued, these disjunctive identifications are explanatorily poor.
One learns much more about the nature of hearts by learning the function that hearts
perform, rather than a lengthy disjunction. And because these disjunctive identifications
are explanatorily inadequate, they are poor contenders for reduction.
Unlike the first two criteria, it is not entirely clear whether the multiple realizability
objection is interpretive or descriptive. That is to say, there are two ways the objection
might be put. It might be framed as a restriction on accounts of level—such that accounts
which preclude properties from being multiply realizable are inadequate accounts—or, al-
ternatively, it might be taken merely count against the presence of levels in the actual
world. On the second approach, the presence of multiply realizable properties indicates
that the disciplines do not stand at higher or lower levels from one another, but there is no
need for an analysis of level to accommodate these types of properties. And so, some might
maintain, an account of level need not allow for multiple realizability. Nevertheless, given
the presumptive abundance of multiply realizable properties, it is plausible that permissive
accounts are more likely to yield levels of scientific discipline.
4. To Remain Agnostic About What The Levels Of Science Are
It is desirable for accounts to remain neutral as to what the actual levels of science are. It
may be that physics occupies a lower level than biology, and it may be that we have evidence
to that eﬀect, but this issue is not one which ought to be settled by considerations about
level alone. What a level is the type of thing which can be demonstrated in a predominantly
a priori manner; that is to say, the conditions in which one science stands at a higher level
than another can be investigated without placing undue weight on the how the sciences are
actually structured. But there are limits to the investigative power of armchair philosophy.
Although one can investigate the notion of level through introspection, it is incumbent
upon scientists to provide information about the way the world actually is. It may be, as
Weinberg (1992) has claimed, that the arrows of explanation point to the very small; that
the lowest level is comprised of a discipline like quantum field or string theory.15 But, if
this is so, it is a conclusion that requires empirical support. A theory of level which itself
determines that quantum field theory (or some other discipline) occupies the lowest level
15Some metaphysicians have argued that the arrows of explanation point toward the very larger, rather
than the very small—see, e.g., Schaﬀer (2010). I note, however, that this type of argument often appeals
to empirical considerations. Schaﬀer maintains that the universe as a whole is in a state of quantum-
entanglement, and that, consequently, there is more information regarding the whole than there is re-
garding its parts. Considerations about quantum entanglement are paradigmatic instances of empirical
considerations.
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oversteps its bounds.16
This is a criterion previous accounts have failed to achieve. One example occurs in ‘The
Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’ (Oppenheim and Putnam (1958)). Oppenheim
and Putnam outline a process of reduction that consists of three stages. In the first stage,
the terms of the higher-order discipline are translated into terms of the lower level discipline;
in the second, the laws of the higher-level discipline are reduced to laws of the lower-level
discipline; and in the third, the laws of the lower-level discipline are themselves unified into
one. Within the first level—in which the predicates of one discipline are translated into
another, there is a process called ‘micro-reduction.’17 In this process, the parts of objects
of the higher order science are the objects which satisfy the predicates of the lower-level
science. For example, if chemistry were to be micro-reduced to physics, the predicate ‘is
water’ is translated into the terms ‘H2O’ only if the parts of the water molecule satisfy
physical predicates.
An account of level in terms of micro-reduction places constraints on which sciences
could be at higher levels than one another. It is impossible, on this approach, for a science
which deals with large objects to be at a lower level than a science which deals with small
objects. In order for the former object to occupy a lower level than the latter, the parts of
the objects of latter must be micro-reduced into objects of the former—and how could it
be that small objects are composed of large ones? It is thus possible to conclude that some
disciplines are not at higher levels than others from the armchair—purely on the basis of
an account of level and the size of objects involved. Notably, this failure occurs at the
very first step of Oppenheim and Putnam’s reduction: before any discussion about laws
occurs. Diﬀerences in size thus prevent any type of reduction on their account. Such an
account is not agnostic as to what the levels of science are, and so fails to satisfy the fourth
desideratum.
5. To Permit Crossover In Subject-Matter Between Levels Of Discipline
The empirical sciences are a motley crew. There are no sharp dividing lines—such that
the practitioners of one field dare not venture forth into another. Although ‘Carbon Diox-
ide’ may be a paradigmatic predicate of chemistry, ecologists investigate whether volcanic
explosions release suﬃcient carbon dioxide to trigger mass extinctions; some psychologists
study how risk-averse people typically are, while behavioral economists investigate how
risk-aversion aﬀects macroeconomic trends; and astronomers and physicists alike are con-
cerned with the implications of general relativity. If the notion of levels of science was
incompatible with interdisciplinary crossover, the prospects of scientific levels would be
16This point was hinted at in Fodor (1974), who claimed “I now want to suggest some reasons for believing
that this consequence of reductivism is intolerable. These are not supposed to be knock-down reasons; they
couldn’t be, given that the question whether reductivism is too strong is finally an empirical question” (pg.
102).
17See, also, Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956).
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poor.18 Some have advocated abandoning the very notion of level on the grounds that no
account could permit such interdisciplinary crossover.19 Because it is impossible to identify
the ‘real level’ of a phenomenon, the very notion of level may be suspect. However, if there
were an account of level which allowed objects to occur at diﬀerent levels, this type of
objection would lose its bite.
Guttman (1976); Potochnik and McGill (2012) discuss this point at length. For them,
the crossover of subject-matter isn’t so much a problem for the notion of scientific level
(they largely assume that levels disallow such crossover), but rather a reason to believe
that levels of disciplines do not exist. One of Guttman’s examples concerns the study of
ecosystems. Although many traditionally conceive of ecosystems as composed of organisms,
he notes that ecosystems are actually composed of numerous kinds of things. There are
water and air molecules, rivers and mountains, etc.. Furthermore, the study of ecosystems
does not concern itself solely with the organisms therein, but rather with how organisms
interact with these other features of their environment.
This observation is in tension with any conception of level incompatible with interdisci-
plinary crossover (which, Shapiro (Forthcoming) argues, includes Oppenheim and Putnam
(1958)’s view). If a concept of level requires that the levels be entirely isolated from one
another, the prospects of levels in scientific discipline would be slim. Numerous things are
objects of study in several disciplines. Craver (2007, 2015) argues on these grounds that
the scientific disciplines, as actually practiced, do not correspond to levels within nature.
Someone studying how ecological systems work would, by necessity, draw on resources from
numerous levels in order to comprehend their object of study. So it may be that the current
disciplines to not align themselves with whatever levels there are in nature. However, if
there were a conception of scientific level which allowed for the crossover of subject-matter,
it may assuage these types of concerns.
The criteria I have discussed are not exhaustive; there may well be further conditions
which we could add. But they are enough to begin. I now turn to current developments
in truth-maker semantics, which I rely upon in this account.
An Overview of the Truth-Maker Approach
The motivating thought behind truth-maker semantics is that there exists something within
the world—a state of aﬀairs, perhaps, or a way that the world is—which verifies, or renders
true, something representational—such as a proposition or a sentence. Moreover, it is held
that the meanings of the representational entities can be identified with that which makes
18This point is briefly endorsed by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), when they allow for there to be
crossover of language between scientific disciplines at diﬀerent levels (pg. 5). However, they deny that an
object at one level has parts at a higher level (pg. 9).
19See Wimsatt (2006).
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them true.20
When stated so generally, this may seem uncontroversial. After all, a great many
philosophers—tracing back at least to Tarski, and possibly as far back as Frege—have
identified the meanings of sentences with their truth-conditions. What diﬀerentiates truth-
maker semantics from more traditional approaches is its commitment to exact truth-
makers. If a state of aﬀairs verifies a proposition it does not merely necessitate its truth,
nor is it merely partially relevant to its true, but rather it is entirely relevant to the its
truth. So, while the state of aﬀairs of grass being green and the sky being blue arguably
verifies ‘Grass is green and the sky is blue,’ it does not verify ‘2`2 “ 4’ despite necessitat-
ing the sentence’s truth, nor does it verify ‘Grass is green’ because a part of that state—the
part concerning the sky being blue—is irrelevant to ‘Grass is green.’
This approach takes seriously the claim that states of aﬀairs are structured: that some
states are proper parts of others. It may be that the state of roses being red is a proper
part of the state of roses being red and violets being blue, and it may be that the state of
Jane being a fox is a part of the state of Jane being a vixen. Given that states are capable
of mereological composition, it is desirable to describe this structure within our formalism.
This is accomplished with a state-space: an ordered pair ă S,Ďą where S is a set of states
of aﬀairs, and Ď is a binary relation on S, with the intended interpretation of parthood,
such that ‘s Ď s1’ asserts that state s is a part of state s1. Here, I make the standard
assumption that parthood is a partial ordering—i.e., that Ď satisfies the following criteria:
REFLEXIVITY: s Ď s
ANTISYMMETRY: ps Ď s1 ^ s1 Ď sq Ñ s “ s1
TRANSITIVITY: ps Ď s1 ^ s1 Ď s2q Ñ s Ď s2
The only additional restriction is that state-spaces are complete—that is to say, they
allow for arbitrary fusion. For states spaces of finite size, this can be accomplished simply by
assuming that every two states within S have a fusion within S. However, this approach
fails for infinitely large state-spaces. For these state-spaces, it may be that every finite
collection of states within S has a fusion within S, but that there are infinitely large
collections of states within S that lack a fusion within S.
Accommodating infinitely large state-spaces requires a few more definitions. First, we
may let an upper bound of T Ď S be a state which contains every state within T as a
part: i.e., t is an upper bound of T iﬀ @s P T, s Ď t. We then say that a state t is a
least-upper-bound of T Ď S iﬀ it is an upper bound of T and is a part of all upper bounds
of T : i.e., just in case if s is a least upper bound of T , then t Ď s. Provably, if a set has a
least upper bound, then it has a unique least upper bound.21 We denote the least upper
20The development of truth-maker semantics is largely due to Fine (2013, 2016, 2017). I rely heavily on
these developments within this paper.
21Suppose, for reductio, that a set T had two least upper bounds t and t1. Because they are both least
upper bounds, they are both upper bounds. And because each least upper bound contains every upper
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bound of T as
Ů
T . A complete state-space is one in which every subset of S contains
a least upper bound within S. For the purposes of this paper, I restrict my attention to
complete state-spaces.
The development of a semantics requires a language which meaning is attributed to.
I restrict my attention to a simple, first-order language. This language contains infinitely
many predicates F1, F2, ..., of fixed adicity, infinitely many names a1, a2, ... such that there
is a unique name for every object, and the logical operators $,^,_—each of which is
defined in the standard way. Additionally, this language is equipped with infinitely many
variables x1, x2, ... and the quantifiers D,@, which serve both to bind the variables and to
express generality.
Let a model M be an ordered quadruple ă S,Ď, I, | ¨ | ą such that ă S,Ďą is a
complete state-space, I is the set of individuals, and | ¨ | is a valuation function which takes,
as its input, an atomic sentence (i.e., the application of a predicate to names of objects—
something like ‘John is human’), and has, as its output, an ordered pair ă V, F ą where
both V and F are subsets of S—intuitively those states of aﬀairs which verify and falsify
the input respectively. So, for example, if the valuation were to take ‘Mary is tall’ as its
input, its output may be the ordered pair ă tMary being tallu, tMary being shortu ą—i.e.,
the ordered pair whose first element is the singleton set containing the state of Mary being
tall, and the second element is the singleton set containing the state of Mary being short.
With the definition of a model in place, we may then define our semantics inductively:
i.` s , Fa iﬀ s P |Fa|V
i.´ s - Fa iﬀ s P |Fa|F
ii.` s , $A iﬀ s - A
ii.´ s - $A iﬀ s , A
iii.` s , A ^ B iﬀ there exist t, u such that t , A and u , B and s “ t \ u.
iii.´ s - A ^ B iﬀ either s - A or s - B
iv.` s , A _ B iﬀ either s , A or s , B
iv.´ s - A _ B iﬀ there exist t, y such that t - A and u , B and s “ t \ u
It is my hope that this semantics is extraordinarily intuitive. Negation swaps a sen-
tence’s verifiers for its falsifiers; if the state of it being windy verifies ‘It is windy’ then it
falsifies ‘It is not windy.’ Verifiers of conjunctions are fusions of verifiers of their conjuncts;
if the state of the ball being red verifies ‘The ball is red,’ and if the state of the ball being
round verifies ‘The ball is round,’ then the fusion of these states—the state of the ball
being red and being round—verifies ‘The ball is red and round.’ Verifiers of disjunctions
are verifiers of a disjunct; if the state of water being wet verifies ‘Water is wet,’ then it also
verifies ‘Water is wet or sand is wet.’
There are several ways to expand this semantics to clauses with quantifiers. We might,
bound as a part, it follows that t Ď t1 and t1 Ď t. Given antisymmetry, this then entails t “ t1.
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for example, countenance generic objects—so that a verifier of ‘Everything is F ’ is a verifier
of a generic object being F . Here, the approach I adopt instead is instantial. Verifiers of
universal statements are fusions of verifiers of their instances. So a verifier of ‘@xFx’ is the
fusion of a verifier of ‘Fa’ with a verifier of ‘Fb,’ etc.. Verifiers of existential statements are
verifiers of their witnessing instances. The state of aﬀairs which verifies ‘DxFx’ is a state
of aﬀairs which makes it the case that a particular object is F . More formally, we have:
v.` s , @xFx iﬀ there is a function f : I Ñ S such that fpiq , F piq for all i P I
and s “ Ůtfpiq : i P Iu
v.´ s - @xFx iﬀ there is some a such that s - Fa
vi.` s , DxFx iﬀ there is some a such that s , Fa
vi.´ s - DxFx iﬀ there is a function f : I Ñ S such that fpiq - F piq for all i P I
and s “ Ůtfpiq : i P Iu
There is a wide variety of philosophical uses for this semantics. Some have argued
that it underlies the logic of analytic content (see Fine (2013, 2016)), deontic logic (see
Fine (2018a,b)), counterfactual conditionals (see Fine (2012a)) and philosophical analysis
(see Correia and Skiles (2017); Elgin (Forthcoming)). But its closest application, to our
present concern, occurs in Elgin (2020). There, I present, and to some extent defend, an
interpretation of identity theory in terms of truth-maker semantics. In particular, I claim
that the distinction between type-identity theory (the claim that every type is identical
to a physical type) and token-identity theory (the claim that every token is identical to
a physical token) is dissolved, and that this dissolution resolves canonical problems with
both interpretations.
At the time, I believed that approach to be incongruous with a leveled conception
of scientific disciplines. By advancing an interpretation according to which everything is
identical to the physical, I promoted a view which seemed to be at best unsuitable for, and
at worst incompatible with, levels of science. However, it has since occurred to me that the
truth-maker approach may also be employed to develop an account of level. It is my hope
that these dual applications vindicate one another: the fact that the very same semantics
possesses the resources for an account of identity and an account of level lends support to
both interpretative aims.
An Account of the Levels of Science
I seek conditions for one scientific discipline to lie at a higher level than another: for what
it is that completes the biconditional Higher Level (D1, D2) iﬀ ..., where both D1 and D2
are disciplines of science. In order to approach this topic systematically, it is incumbent
to begin by accounting for what D1 and D2 are: to describe what it is that a scientific
discipline consists of.
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Here, I identify disciplines with sets of predicates.22 We might, for example, identify
chemistry with t‘is a chemical compound’, ‘is carbon’, ... u. Of course, there is a great
deal more to a scientific discipline than a set of predicates. Each may come with its own
laws, methodologies, questions, journals, and much more besides. The identification of
disciplines with predicates might seem to be a gross oversimplification—perhaps so much
so that it threatens the viability of this program from the outset. No matter. It may be
that my project is only one step toward a more complete story, but it remains an important
step to take.
But it is not enough to claim that each discipline is identified with a set of predicates,
for that does not determine which predicates are associated with which disciplines. What
is it in virtue of that ‘is extinct’ is not plausibly a predicate of chemistry, and that ‘is
spin-up’ is identified with quantum-mechanics, rather than ecology?
There are at least two approaches we might take. The first is constructivist in spirit.
Perhaps the predicates of a science are simply the predicates that practitioners of that
science actually use. If we want to discover which predicates are physical predicates, we
must simply look at the physics journals; if practicing physicists discuss ‘mass’ then ‘mass’
is a physical predicate, and if ecologists use ‘ is symbiotic’ then ‘is symbiotic’ is an ecological
predicate. On this conception, scientists play an integral role in what the science consists
of. For, in their choice of predicates, they determine which predicates are assigned to which
discipline.
Another approach calls for less reliance upon scientific practice. Rather than taking
usage to determine the predicates of a scientific domain, we might, rather, identify the
predicates of a discipline with those that figure in a statement of its laws.23 Thus, for
example, if F “ ma were a law of physics, then ‘force,’ ‘mass,’ and ‘acceleration’ would all
belong to the language of physics. And if the special sciences are also equipped with their
own laws (perhaps Gresham’s Law is a law of economics, the Ideal Gas Law is a law of
chemistry, etc.) they too can be identified with predicates occurring within these laws. Of
course, there may be important diﬀerences between the laws of physics and the laws of the
22For a precursor to this identification, see Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), who assert “We shall suppose
that with each level there is associated a list of the theoretical predicates normally employed to characterize
things on that level at present...And when we speak of a theory concerning a given level, we will mean not
only a theory whose universe of discourse is that level, but one whose predicates long to the appropriate
list” (pg. 10).
23This method was suggested by Fodor (1974), who claimed “Every science implies a taxonomy of the
events in its universe of discourse. In particular, every science employs a descriptive vocabulary of theoretical
and observational predicates such that events fall under the laws of that science by virtue of satisfying those
predicates...If I knew what a law is, and if I believed that scientific theories consist just of bodies of laws,
then I could say that P is a natural kind predicate relative to S iﬀ S contains proper laws of the form
Px Ñ αx or αx Ñ Px; roughly, the natural kind predicates of a science are the ones whose terms are
the bound variables in its proper laws” (pg. 101-2). For the purposes of this paper, I will largely sidestep
the further question of what it takes for something to be a law of science. I take it that the identification
of scientific disciplines with predicates figuring in statements of law is available to both the Humean and
anti-Humean.
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special sciences—it is widely believed that while the laws of physics hold universally, the
laws of the special sciences allow for exceptions. And it is worth noting that any scientific
discipline that did not involve laws of some kind or other could not appeal to this method
of identification. But, insofar as many diverse disciplines employ laws, these laws could
be used to select a set of predicates. This method might be seen to reverse the order of
Oppenheim and Putnam’s conception of reduction. Rather than first reducing the language
of one discipline to another before reducing the laws, this approach employs the laws in
order to determine what it is the relevant languages are.
However it is that predicates are ultimately determined, select two disciplines which
are identified by the following:
D1 “ tF1, F2, ...u
D2 “ tG1, G2, ...u
Where the number of predicates within each discipline may or may not be finite.
The motivation behind this account is that the relation between D1 and D2 arises from
the mereological structure of states of aﬀairs. It may be that ‘a is a water molecule’ has
verifiers, and that these verifiers have proper parts.24 Perhaps the state which verifies
that a is water is itself composed of states of aﬀairs concerning hydrogen and oxygen—i.e.,
perhaps that which makes it the case that a is a water molecule is something which can
be decomposed into states which make it the case that the parts of a are hydrogen and
oxygen composed in a particular configuration. If this is correct, we might account for
the diﬀerence in level between chemistry and physics, for example, by appealing to the
fact that the verifiers of chemical statements (i.e., statements which predicate a chemical
predicate of an object or some objects) are composed of verifiers of physical statements
(i.e., statements which predicate a physical predicate of an object or some objects). So, at
an extremely rough first pass, we might claim:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
s , Fa Ñ ppptq Ď sq Ñ ptq , Gaq
For the moment, let ptq remain a free variable ranging over states of aﬀairs. This
proposal claims that discipline D1 is at a higher level than discipline D2 just in case, if
state s verifies Fa, then if ptq is a part of s, then t verifies Ga. Obviously, refinements
are required at the outset—minimally, s, F , a and G must be replaced by terms bound
by various quantifiers. After all, it is not enough for there to be a particular state of
aﬀairs, predicate and object for which this condition holds; rather, it applies generally.
Interestingly, the choice and placement of these quantifiers impacts the satisfaction of
24Note that this particular example is more amenable to the first, rather than the second, method of
identifying the predicates of scientific disciplines. It seems unlikely that there are laws which mention water.
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the theoretical desiderata.25 Replacing the terms with variables under the appropriate
quantifiers results in the following:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
@s,@Fn,@xps , Fnx Ñ pptq Ď s Ñ DGmpptq , Gmxqqq
As before, ptq remains a free variable. This claims that D1 is at a higher level than D2
just in case for all states of aﬀairs, for all predicates within D1, and for all objects, if a
state verifies that an object falls under the scope of a higher-level predicate, then if ptq is
a part of that state, then ptq verifies that the object falls under the scope of a lower-level
predicate.
Yet another refinement is in order. It need not be the very same object which satisfies
the higher-level predicate be the object which satisfies the lower-level predicate. If an
object is a water molecule, it need not be the very same object which satisfies the predicates
‘hydrogen’ and ‘oxygen.’ So instead of requiring that a state which verifies that an object
is F is composed of states which verify that the very same object is G, I allow for these
states to verify that some object or other is G, i.e.:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
@s,@Fn,@xps , Fnx Ñ pptq Ď s Ñ DGmDypptq , Gmyqqq
Perhaps some suspect that further restrictions are needed After all, if an object is
a water molecule, it is not merely the case that some-objects-or-other are hydrogen and
oxygen; rather, the parts of that very water molecule are hydrogen and oxygen. So, perhaps
we ought to impose the further requirement that the objects which satisfy the predicates of
the lower-level discipline compose the objects which satisfy the predicate of the higher-level
discipline.
This is not an approach I take. I note that as the formalism stands, the relation of
mereological composition is not defined upon the set of objects; it is a relation that holds
between states of aﬀairs. In order to describe mereological relations between objects, the
semantics would need to be revamped—to reintroduce a notion of composition which holds
between objects. Of course, nothing would stop us from modifying the semantics in this
way, but it is incapable of this further refinement as it is currently formalized.
So far so good, but we now face the elephant in the room: the free variable ptq. As I
suspect everyone with even a rudimentary understanding of logic has thought of by now,
an obvious thing to do is to bind this variable with a universal quantifier. On this proposal,
if a state verifies that an object is F (for some higher-level predicate F ), it must be the
case that every part of that state verifies that an object is G (for some lower-level predicate
G). We would then have:
25This point is discussed in greater depth when below in reference to the desideratum concerning multiple
realizability.
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Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
@s,@Fn,@xps , Fnx Ñ @tpt Ď s Ñ DGmDypt , Gmyqqq
This proposal has the advantage of being truth-evaluable: it has the disadvantage of
being false. The problem is perhaps easiest to appreciate by shifting back to the (arguably
more conventional) way of understanding mereology as a relation between objects. If a
water molecule is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, it isn’t the case that every part
of that water molecule is either hydrogen or oxygen. After all, these atomic parts can
themselves be decomposed into their subatomic constituents. A proton which partially
composes the oxygen atom is itself a part of the water molecule, but the proton is neither
hydrogen nor oxygen. This problem resurfaces when mereology is taken to be a relation
between states. Suppose that state s is the state of a’s being a water molecule, and further
that this state verifies ‘a is a water molecule.’ It may be that this state can be decomposed
into states concerning atomic physics—i.e., states concerning hydrogen and oxygen. These
states may themselves be decomposed into states which verify that objects are electrons,
protons, quarks, and the like. If this is so, then state s has parts which do not verify that
an object satisfies the predicates of atomic physics. Some of its parts concern subatomic
physics, rather than atomic physics. And so, on the present proposal, this would insure
that chemistry is not at a higher level than atomic physics. But, surely, this is not the kind
of thing which ought to prevent one discipline from occupying a higher level than another.
So the universal quantifier doesn’t work: it’s just too strong.
Exchanging the universal for an existential quantifier is hardly an improvement. If all
that we require of a higher-level science is that a part of a verifier for one of its expressions
involves a lower-level science, there seems no hope for a notion of reduction. Suppose, for
example, that there were a discipline which involved the interactions of atomic physics and
disembodied minds. A state verifies ‘Fa’ in this discipline, just in case a part of it verifies
that there is a disembodied mind and another part verifies that a is a hydrogen atom.
In this case, a part of a verifier of ‘Fa’ concerns atomic physics, so this discipline would
occupy a higher level than atomic physics (assuming that other verifiers acted appropriately
as well). But it would be absurd to take this to lend support to the claim that this discipline
reduces to atomic physics. After all, a part of its subject-matter is disembodied minds;
something which has nothing to do with atomic physics at all.The universal quantifier is
far too strong, the existential quantifier is far too weak. Some intermediate position is
required instead.26
For the sake of clarity, let us once again revert to discussions of mereology in terms of
objects. What does it mean to claim that two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms compose a
26It might also be suggested that we require a notion of normality or typicality: perhaps a typical part of
a verifier of the higher-level discipline involves a verifier of the lower level discipline. I myself am skeptical
that this strategy will succeed. It seems eminently plausible to me that a a verifier of ‘a is a hydrogen atom’
involves subatomic, rather than atomic particles—after all, every helium atom is composed of subatomic
particles.
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water molecule. It isn’t to claim that the only parts of the water molecule are the hydrogen
and oxygen atoms; after all, the parts of these atoms are themselves parts of the molecule.
Rather, the claim is that the hydrogen and oxygen atoms collectively leave nothing out—
the object which is composed of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms misses no part of the water
molecule; it is identical to it. A similar move can be made with regard to the mereology
of states of aﬀairs. The claim that the parts of state s verify that something is G does not
amount to the claim that all parts of s verify that something is G. Rather, it is the claim
that we can fully describe state s—we can leave nothing out—when describing its parts
that verify that something is G. That is to say, the fusions of the parts of s (each of which
verify that something is G) have a fusion which is identical to s.
There are (at least) two ways could represent this formally, one of which employs
plural quantification and the other of which quantifies over sets. I will primarily address
the formulation in terms of set-quantification, but I mean nothing metaphysically robust by
that choice. As before, allowing S to be the set of states of aﬀairs, results in the following
condition:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
@s,@Fn,@xps , Fnx Ñ DT Ď SpŮT “ s ^ @t P T, DGm, Dypt , Gmyqqq
The notation is becoming more cumbersome, but the underlying thought (hopefully)
remains intuitive. If a state of aﬀairs verifies that an object is F (where F is a predicate
of the higher-level discipline), then there exists some set of state of aﬀairs, the fusion of
which is identical to s, and such that each element of that set verifies that an object is
G (where G is a predicate of the lower-level discipline). This is perfectly compatible with
with the claim that s has parts which don’t verify that something is G; all that is required
is that s is identical to some fusion or other of states which do verify that something
is G. If these states themselves have parts which are unrelated to G, that’s perfectly
fine. We also resolve the problem which plagued the existential quantifier—of a discipline
concerning atomic physics and disembodied minds. If a state s cannot be decomposed
into states which purely concern atomic physics (because, perhaps, one part of s concerns
disembodied minds), then it does not satisfy the present conditions.
At long last, we have arrived at a putative account of what it takes for a discipline to
be at a higher level than another. It is now possible to examine how it fairs—to determine
whether it satisfies the desiderata for a theory of level. The first, and arguably most
indispensable, criterion was that an account ought to form a strict-partial ordering over
the disciplines—that it ought to be irreflexive, transitive and asymmetric. So how does the
present account fare?
Not well, unfortunately. The relation is transitive, alright, but it’s also reflexive. That
is to say, not only is this account compatible with the claim that a discipline is at a higher
than itself, but rather it entails that every discipline is at a higher level than itself.27
27To see why this is the case, select an arbitrary discipline D, which may be identified with the predicates
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Something has gone wrong, and rather catastrophically so. In comparison to accounts
with a free variable, this at least has the virtue of being truth-evaluable—but it has the vice
of being false. It cannot be correct as it stands, for it fails to satisfy a central requirement
for a theory of level.
What is it that went wrong? It seems to me that the account has narrowly missed its
mark. The relation it defines is not that of being at a higher level than, but rather being
at the same or a higher level than. I had attempted to define ą, but ultimately defined
ě instead. But once we have a definition of ě, it is straightforward to define ą. To be
greater than is to be greater than or equal to and not equal to. In the present context:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
@s,@Fn,@xps , Fnx Ñ DT Ď SpŮT “ s ^ @t P T, DGm, Dypt , Gmyqqq ^ D1 ‰
D2.
This simply results from appending the requirement that the disciplines not be identical
to the previous account. What does it mean to claim that D1 ‰ D2? On the present
approach, disciplines are identified with sets of predicates, so to say that two disciplines
are distinct is to say that their respective predicates are distinct.
There are two ways in which this requirement might be met—one more demanding
than the other. On the more demanding conception, we might require that the discipline’s
predicates be entirely distinct—that no predicate employed within one discipline be em-
ployed by the other. On the less demanding conception, all that is required is that the
disciplines have at least some predicates that are distinct. Perhaps they have no predicates
in common at all, but there may be some overlap. All that is required is that one discipline
have a predicate which is not a predicate of the other.
I suspect that the demanding conception is too restrictive for practical purposes. Of
course, from a logical perspective, the conditions are perfectly well defined. But I think it
unlikely that any scientific discipline is at a higher level than another with this restriction in
place. Minimally, it seems inevitable that numerous disciplines will employ mathematical
predicates. If this practice precluded them from being at higher levels than the other,
it seems unlikely that the disciplines would be leveled. However, even if we jettison the
restrictive conception, the moderate one remains. All that is required, on this conception,
is that a discipline have some predicates that the other lacks. But whichever approach
we adopt, the first theoretical desideratum is satisfied: this account forms a strict partial
ordering.
The second requirement was that an account of level ought to explain the sense in
which higher level sciences reduce to lower level sciences. If chemistry is at a higher level
than physics, there ought to be a way in which chemical truths can be reduced to physical
truths.
F1, F2, ... . Select an arbitrary s, Fn and x such that s , Fnx—i.e., an arbitrary state of aﬀairs that an
arbitrary object is F for an arbitrary F . In this case, there is a T Ď S (in particular, tsu) such that ŮT “ s
(i.e.,
Ůtsu “ sq and every element of T verifies that some object or other is Fn (i.e., Dxps , Fnxq).
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This is a requirement the present account easily accommodates. If chemistry occupies
a higher level than physics, then states of aﬀairs which verify that an object is F (for a
chemical predicate F ) are composed of states of aﬀairs which verify that an object is G (for
a physical predicate G). The reason this account is reductive is precisely the same reason
that other mereological accounts are reductive: the fusion of parts is literally identical to
a whole.
The third criterion is that an account of scientific level ought to allow for predicates to
be multiply realized. It may be that ‘heart’ is a biological predicate, but that hearts may
be composed of many types of things. Perhaps carbon shaped thus-and-so constitutes a
heart in many cases, but an artificial heart composed of plastic counts as well. Minimally,
an account of level ought not preclude the possibility that some predicates may be multiply
realized.
It is here that the power of the truth-maker account comes to the fore. There is no
requirement, on this approach, that the truth-makers of predicates resemble one another in
any way. The claim ‘John has a heart’ may have a truth-maker which is vastly dissimilar
from truth-makers of ‘Jane has a heart.’ For a higher-level predicate F , all that is required
is that, for an arbitrary name a, Fa be decomposable into states concerning lower level
predicates G. There is no requirement that these be the same lower level predicates which
Fb is decomposible into. It may be that a verifier of Fa concerns predicates G1 ´ Gm,
whille a verifier of Fb concerns predicates Gn ´Go. That is to say, what makes it the case
that a is F concerns some lower-level predicates, and what makes it the case that b is F
concerns diﬀerent lower-level predicates. So long as each instance may be decomposed into
states concerning some lower-level predicates or other, the present conditions are satisfied.
It was important, when developing this account, to place the quantifiers as they are
placed. Consider the following alternative, which simply shifts the placement of an exis-
tential quantifier:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
@s,@Fn,@x, DGmps , Fnx Ñ DT Ď SpŮT “ s ^ @t P T, Dypt , Gmyqqq ^ D1 ‰
D2.
This account is less equipped to accommodate multiple realizability. It requires that, for
every predicate of the higher-level science, there be a unique lower-level predicate such that
states which verify the higher level predicate may be decomposed into states concerning
the lower level predicate. If a state which verifies ‘John has a heart’ may be decomposed
into states concerning ‘Carbon,’ then ‘Jane has a heart’ must be decomposable into states
concerning ‘Carbon’ as well (assuming that biology is at a higher level than chemistry).
Moving the quantifier further left results in an account which is more restrictive still:
Higher Level(D1, D2) iﬀ
DGm,@s,@Fn,@xps , Fnx Ñ DT Ď SpŮT “ s ^ @t P T, Dypt , Gmyqqq ^ D1 ‰
D2.
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This does not only require that states concerning higher-level predicates be decompos-
able into states concerning (the same) lower-level predicate. Rather, it makes the stronger
claim that there is a unique lower-level predicate which every higher-level predicate may
be decomposed into. Both of these alternatives are far more restrictive than the original
account which, in contrast, has no diﬃculty in accounting for predicates which are multiply
realized.
The fourth requirement was that an account ought not to take a stand on what the
levels of the empirical sciences actually are. One cannot, simply by reflecting upon the
concept of level, come to realize that ecology is at a higher level than physics. And we
recall that this is a criterion that other accounts failed to achieve. Some, like Oppenheim
and Putnam (1958), took a stand in requiring that higher-level sciences address larger
objects than lower-level sciences did.
This is an area where the shift to discussions of mereology in terms of states of aﬀairs,
rather than objects, proves beneficial. It is natural to think of the mereology of states
as mirroring, perhaps imperfectly, the mereology of objects. So if hydrogen and oxygen
compose water, states of aﬀairs concerning hydrogen and oxygen compose states of aﬀairs
concerning water. And, indeed, many examples I have used throughout this paper take
that precise form. However there is nothing in the truth-maker approach which requires
this alignment. It may be that the mereology of states of aﬀairs comes entirely apart
from the mereology of objects. Perhaps oxygen and hydrogen compose water, but states
of aﬀairs about water compose states of aﬀairs about oxygen and hydrogen. This may
be unintuitive, but there is nothing from a semantic perspective which precludes this
possibility. And so this account does not assume that sciences concerning smaller objects
are the only candidates for lower-level sciences. Of course, it may turn out that these types
of objects lie at the more fundamental level, but this is not something which follows from
the account of level alone.
The last criterion is that I mentioned is that there should be some crossover between
the subject matter of disciplines at diﬀerent levels. Coming to recognize that two fields are
compatible may increase our general understanding, but compatibility is not itself enough
to guarantee that the sciences operate at diﬀerent levels from one another.
In the first place, this is achieved by allowing the same predicates to occur within
disciplines at diﬀerent levels. If both ecology and chemistry employ the predicate ‘hydro-
gen,’ then they may be disciplines which concern hydrogen. And the more predicates that
disciplines have in common, the greater the overlap in their subject matter will be.
As it turns out, there already exists an account of subject-matter in terms of truth-
maker semantics. ? outlines one such account, partially in response to Yablo (2014). Fine
is primarily concerned with the subject-matter of sentences, rather than disciplines. He
identifies the subject-matter of sentences with the fusions of their verifiers. Let us suppose
that ‘Roses are red or violets are blue’ has two verifiers—the state of roses being red and
the state of violets being blue. In this case, the subject-matter of the sentence—what the
sentence is about—is the state of aﬀairs of roses being red and violets being blue. Any
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other sentence whose fusion of verifiers is the same (e.g., the sentence ‘Roses are red and
violets are blue’) is about precisely the same thing. Some sentences have a subject matter
which is a part of others. If the only verifier of ‘Roses are red’ is the state of roses being
red, then the subject-matter of ‘roses are red’ is a part of the subject matter of ‘Roses are
red or violets are blue.’ The subject-matter of the atomic sentence is a literal part of the
subject-matter of the disjunctive sentence.
It is readily possible to expand this account of subject-matter to disciplines. Once
we identify disciplines with sets of predicates, we might identify the subject matter of
a discipline with the fusion of the verifiers of all sentences within that language. So, for
example, if chemistry consists partially in ‘Nitrogen’ and ‘Helium,’ then the subject-matter
of chemistry will be the fusion of states of aﬀairs which verify that a is hydrogen with those
that verify that b is Helium, etc..
The contention that leveled disciplines are about the same thing can be interpreted
almost literally on the present approach. The states of aﬀairs which make it the case that
higher-level predicates obtain are all composed of states which make lower-level predicates
obtain. So the subject matter of a higher level discipline is literally a part of the subject-
matter of the lower-level discipline. And so this accounts for leveled disciplines to share
the same subject-matter.
Conclusion
It has been my aim to explicate an account of scientific level on the truth-maker approach.
This account, I maintain, satisfies numerous plausible criteria for scientific level. As such,
it is a promising interpretation.
I close by noting the relation between this account and other aspects of my work. In
Elgin (2020), I argued that truth-maker semantics possesses the resources for an account
of identity theory: a plausible interpretation of the claim that everything is identical to the
physical. As an identity relation, this interpretation was reflexive, transitive and symmet-
ric. I have here argued that the very same semantics possesses the theoretical resources
for an interpretation of level; a transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric relation. That the
same framework accommodates two ends (incommensurable as they may seem) oﬀers some
vindication for the approach as a whole.
Independently, in Elgin (Forthcoming), I argue that truth-maker semantics is the ap-
propriate setting for generalized identity: sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ (e.g.,
‘To be morally right is to maximize utility,’ ‘To be a person is to be a rational animal.)
which share the logical and modal profile of identity. These sentences themselves are re-
flexive, transitive and symmetric. However, there is another reading of ‘To be F is to be
G’ which does not resemble an identity. On this reading, sentences of the form ‘to be F is
to be F ’ are universally false, and if ‘To be F is to be G’ is true, then ‘To be G is to be
F ’ is false. This alternate reading might, instead of a ‘generalized identity,’ be referred to
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as a ‘real definition.’ And so, as with interpretations of scientific discipline, there is one
reading which resembles and identity, and another which is ordered.
It is my view that the two problems are not only analogous, but identical. Any resources
which provides an adequate account of science will provide an account of metaphysics as
well. Thus far, I have employed truth-maker semantics to provide an account of generalized
identity, identity-based interpretations of physicalism, and the levels of scientific discipline.
It remains to be shown how this approach may account for real definition as well.
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